Aim This research aimed to investigate multidimensional Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities in subjects with alcohol use disorder (AS).
Introduction
The aim of this study is to investigate the Theory of Mind -or "Mindreading" -originally defined Only a few studies have focused on ToM in subjects with alcohol use disorder (hereafter AS) and found deficits in such ability. Uekermann and colleagues (Uekermann et al. 2007 ), while investigating humor processing in AS, found that group comparisons revealed cognitive as well as affective humor processing deficits in AS compared to control subjects (hereafter CS). The observed impairments were related in particular to theory of mind (lower scores by AS on three mentalistic questions about the characters of the jokes employed) and executive functions (working memory).
A recent study by Maurage and colleagues ( Maurage et al. 2011b ) have suggested a possible difference between 'cognitive empathy' i.e. the perspective-taking ability which makes it possible to understand and predict the other person's various mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires, ideas) and 'emotional empathy', i.e. the ability to detect and experience other peoples' emotional states. These results suggest that 'cognitive empathy' might be better preserved than 'emotional empathy'. These Considering the relative lack of empirical research on this topic, we decided to assess ToM abilities in a sample of AS. ToM has a complex nature and cannot be reduced to an on-off or an all-or- A first and well known distinction in the literature is between first and second-order ToM. Firstorder ToM reasoning requires an understanding of a character's belief about a state of the world, while success in second-order tasks requires the attribution of nested mental states, that is an understanding of a character's belief about the beliefs of another character, which turns out to be more difficult (Mazza et al. 2001) . A second important distinction is that between first and third- In the light of these considerations, the aim of the present study was to conduct a broad assessment of ToM abilities in subjects with alcohol use disorder. To fulfill this goal we used (as described in However, we also expected some aspects of ToM to be better preserved than others in AS. In particular, we expected:
ii. Second-order ToM to be more difficult than first-order ToM;
iii Third-person ToM to be more difficult than first-person ToM;
iv. For explorative purposes we also investigated whether a difference exists between tasks requiring an allocentric vs. egocentric perspective.
Methods

Participants
Twenty-two persons (15 men and 7 women; age: mean = 49.64 ± 8.08 years; years of formal education: mean = 11.77 ± 4.140) with a history of chronic abuse of alcohol (defined as per DSM- The interview is composed of questions organized along four scales, each focusing on one of the knowledge domains in which a person's ToM may be manifested.
• Scale A, I-Me. This investigates the interviewee's knowledge of her own mental states. The viewpoint of the questions is centered on the interviewee (I) reflecting on her own mental states (Me). This scale investigates first-person ToM.
• Scale B, Other-Self. This investigates the knowledge that, according to the interviewee, other persons have of their own mental states, independently of the subject's perspective.
The viewpoint of the questions is centered on other persons (Other) reflecting on their own mental states (Self). This scale investigates third-person ToM from an egocentric perspective.
Theory of Mind in alcohol use disorder however, here it is centered on the interviewee. This scale investigates third-person ToM from an allocentric perspective.
• Scale D, Other-Me. This investigates the knowledge that, from the interviewee's point of view, others have of her mental states. The viewpoint of the questions is centered on the other persons (Other) reflecting on the mental states of the interviewee (Me). This scale can be compared with a second-order ToM task, in that the abstract form of the questions is:
''What do you think that others think that you think?".
Each scale is divided into three subscales that, respectively, explore the dimensions of Awareness, Relation and Realization of mental states:
• Awareness. This investigates the interviewee's ability to perceive and differentiate beliefs, desires and emotions in herself and in others.
• Relation. This investigates the interviewee's ability to recognize causal relations between different mental states and between them and the resulting behaviors. For example: ''When you feel bad, do you feel you understand why?".
• Realization. This investigates the interviewee's ability to adopt effective strategies to achieve a desired state affecting one's own and others' mental states and behavior. For The two judges reached a significant level of inter-reliability on their first judgments of the answers
given by subjects with alcohol use disorder and control subjects, considered separately, in both cases taking into account the total Th.o.m.a.s. scores (Correlation Coefficient: 6,86 < Z <10,37; 0,0001 < p < .0001) (Correlation Coefficient: 2,37 < Z < 7,05; 0,02 < p < 0,0001). They discussed each item upon which they disagreed in order to reach a full agreement and assign the final score.
Strange Stories
In addition to the Tho.m.a.s, the Strange Stories test (Happé et al. 1999) was administered in vivo to both subjects with alcohol use disorder and controls.
We presented a selection of six Strange Stories, excluding those that require the comprehension of communicative acts such as metaphors and irony. An example is the following story: ''A burglar who has just robbed a shop is making his getaway. As he is running home, a policeman on his beat sees him drop his glove. He doesn't know the man is a burglar, he just wants to tell him he dropped his glove. But when the policeman shouts out to the burglar, 'Hey, you! Stop', the burglar turns round, sees the policeman and gives himself up. He puts his hands up and admits that he committed Theory of Mind in alcohol use disorder 11 the break-in at the local shop." The subject is asked: ''Why did the burglar do that?" In line with the literature (Happé et al. 1999) a correct interpretation of the situation requires the subject to assess the burglar's mental state and to realize that he misunderstood the policeman's intention, which was to give back the glove. To explore this result, we conducted a post-hoc pairwise comparison using a Bonferroni correction (p < .05) in both the subjects with alcohol use disorder and the control group. The test revealed a significant difference both in AS (p = .001) and in CS ( p= .001), between Scale A, which assesses first-order ToM, and Scale D, which assesses second-order ToM. Both groups performed worse on [Insert Fig. 2 about here] Figure 3 shows the mean score for the AS and control groups for each kind of mental state scale (beliefs, desires, positive and negative emotions). For explorative purposes a repeated measures ANOVA was performed with a two-level between-subjects factor (Group: AS vs. CS) and a four- .597; p = 6.18). The post-hoc pairwise comparison with a Bonferroni correction revealed differences in performance among the mental state types for CS: they performed better when they answered questions concerning desires than both negative (p = .023) and positive (p = .024) emotions (not the same for AS: p = .077, p = .1); the other comparisons did not reveal any significant differences (.60 < p < .1).
Results
Th.o.m.a.s.
[Insert Fig. 3 about here]
Strange Stories task
Contrary to our expectations, a t-test revealed that there was no significant difference between AS (mean = .849 ± .166) and CS (mean = .933 ± .117) on the Strange Stories task, although the percentages went in the expected directions. Table 1 ).
Correlations within the sample of AS
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Discussion
The aim of the research was to explore ToM impairments in case of severe chronic alcohol abuse 
